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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

JOYCE K. JACOBSEN (Kalanquin),
Plaintiff and Appellant

PETITION FOR REHEARING

vs.
SHIRLEY F. JACOBSEN,
Defendant and Appellee.

Appellate Court No. 930496-CA

A request to the Court of Appeals to review its decision of
March 28, 1995, which upheld the decision of June 30, 1993 of the
First District Court, Cache County, State of Utah, Judge Gordon
J. Low presiding, denying the Plaintiff-Appellant's MOTION TO SET
ASIDE DIVORCE DECREE AND FOR NEW TRIAL ON ISSUES OF PROPERTY
SETTLEMENT.
Argument Priority Classification is 15.
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Summary of The Argument
This Petition For Rehearing is submitted by the PlaintiffAppellant (hereinafter Mrs. Kalanquin) pursuant to Rule 35, Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure.

Following are points of law or

fact which the Court of Appeals has overlooked or misapprehended
and petitioner's arguments thereon.

Mrs. Kalanquin's claims are

fourfold: (1) the Court applied the incorrect standard of review
of the trial court's interpretation of the term "disclosure"; (2)
the Court misapprehended the fundamental issue and position which
Mrs. Kalanquin was arguing; (3) the Court overlooked and failed
to address pivotal points of argument in Mrs. Kalanquin's brief
pertaining to interpretation of the term "disclosure"; and (4)
the Court overlooked and failed to address Mrs. Kalanquin's
alternative argument that a meeting of the minds had not
occurred.

Point 1
The Court of Appeals appears to have misapprehended the
standard of review regarding the trial court's interpretation of
the term "disclosure".
In the Court's Memorandum Decision (hereinafter decision) of
April 28, 1995, it discusses the issue of disclosure of property
at Page 3.

The court there states:

"We do not find the court's

interpretation of 'disclosure' unwarranted."

The court further

states that the district court's interpretation of the term
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"disclosure" is consistent with the definition of that term in
Black's Law Dictionary.
The Court, however, seems to have failed to recognize that
the standard of review is not whether the district court's
interpretation is warranted or reasonable or consistent; the
standard of review is whether the district court's interpretation
is correct.

[See Brief of Mrs. Kalanquin at Page 2; Stacey

Properties v. Wixen, 766 P2d 1080 (Utah App. 1988); Faulkner v.
Farnsworth, 714 P2d 1149, 1150 (Utah 1986); and In Re; The Estate
of Leone Southwick v. Leone, 222 Utah Advance Reports 60 (Utah
App. 1993).]
Under the cases cited, the appeals court is required to
review the trial court's interpretation of the term "disclosure"
for correctness and to render its independent interpretation of
that term.
this.

It does not appear that the court of appeals did

Rather, it appears that the trial court's interpretation

was simply upheld as "not ... unwarranted" and as "consistent
with" other accepted definitions. [Memorandum Decision, page 3.]

Point 2
The Court of Appeals appears to have misapprehended what
Mrs. Kalanquin was challenging in the trial court's decision.
The Court of Appeals appears to have misunderstood what Mrs.
Kalanquin was arguing.

On page 1 of its decision it states that

Mrs. Kalanquin is "challenging the trial court's finding that she
had knowledge of all of her [sic] Jacobsen's property".
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This is

incorrect.

Mrs. Kalanquin is challenging the trial court's

finding that there was a "disclosure" of all of the DefendantAppellee's (hereinafter Mr. Jacobsen) property.

[See Statement

of the Issues in Mrs. Kalanquin's brief at page 1.]

Under the

correct interpretation of "disclosure", asserted by Mrs.
Kalanquin, any knowledge she may have had of Mr. Jacobsen's
property is irrelevant.

Point 3
The Court of Appeals overlooked and failed to address the
points of argument raised by Mrs. Kalanquin as to how the term
"disclosure" should be interpreted.
In her brief, under Detail of The Argument, numbers 1
through 5 (pages 10-15) and number 9 (pages 25-26), Mrs.
Kalanquin sets forth the requisite rules, supported by legal
authority, by which interpretation of the term "disclosure"
should be done.

The brief of Mr. Jacobsen completely failed to

address Mrs. Kalanquin's arguments regarding these.
understandable.

This is

There is simply nothing in the trial record

indicating that the trial court observed these requirements of
interpretation.

However, the Court of Appeals, in its decision,

is likewise devoid of such observance.

Although such rules of

interpretation are quite elementary it is this very fundamental
nature that makes them most deserving of a response.
The trial court's interpretation of the meaning of
"disclosure" made it nearly a synonym for "discovered".
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While

this may be warranted by and consistent with Mr. Black's
definition (which shows variant meanings), it still does not
reveal what the correct definition is, in the context of the
Stipulation of August 27, 1987, as determined by the rules of
interpretation by which the courts should be bound.
The single, overriding issue which Mrs. Kalanquin argued in
her brief regards the interpretation of the term "disclosure".
This issue colors all others.

The Court appears to have the

misapprehension that Mrs. Kalanquin is trying to relieve herself
"from a stipulation negotiated and entered into with the advice
of counsel." [Memorandum Decision at page 3.]

On the contrary,

Mrs. Kalanquin is seeking to enforce the terms of the
Stipulation, which Mr. Jacobsen also negotiated and entered into
with the advice of counsel.

What Mrs. Kalanquin is trying to

relieve herself of is the trial court's incorrect interpretation
of a term of that Stipulation.

If the trial court's

interpretation of "disclosure" is incorrect then this case must
be remanded to determine whether disclosure took place and if so,
whether such disclosure was full and complete, as required under
the Stipulation.

Point 4
The Court of Appeals overlooked and failed to address the
alternative argument of Mrs. Kalanquin that a meeting of the
minds had not occurred.
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In her brief, at page 26, Mrs. Kalanquin argued that if the
meaning of the term "disclosure" was found to be ambiguous and
the interpretations by Plaintiff-Appellant and Defendant-Appellee
are equally reasonable, there was not a meeting of the minds
sufficient to form a contract.

In that event, the Stipulation of

August 27, 1987, and the Order which derived therefrom would be
void and the parties must find themselves at the point prior to
Stipulation.
It does not appear that the Court of Appeals considered this
argument.
Conclusion
From the Memorandum Decision of the Court of Appeals it
appears that the Court overlooked or misapprehended several
facts, arguments, or points of law which would be determinative
of this appeal.

Mrs. Kalanquin humbly petitions the Court to

consider again the above noted points, review her brief in this
appeal and grant the relief requested therein.
We the undersigned, Attorneys for the Petitioner, certify
that this Petition For Rehearing is presented in good faith and
not for delay.
Respectfully submitted this

[(/—

Day of

Aflnt/

MICHAEL W. ISBELL
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, 1995.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the J\L~ day of ftfx?^ <
1994,
two (2) true and correct copies of the foregoing ^PETITION FOR
REHEARING, were hand delivered to the following:
Thomas L. Willmore
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 525
Logan, Utah 84321
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Attorney
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